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FOR CARTER FROM PA

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE AND KENNETH H. BACON FRONT PAGE WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE, TUESDAY, APRIL 18 HEADED "DETENTE'S DECLINE--EVEN A SALT TREATY IS UNLIKELY TO RELIEVE US-SOVIET TENSIONS."

2. WASHINGTON--US-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE COME A LONG WAY SINCE DETENTE BEGAN A FEW YEARS AGO.

3. A LONG WAY DOWN.

4. ONE MEASURE OF THE STRAIN: NOT ONLY ARE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVING TROUBLE IN REACHING A NEW NUCLEAR ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENT, BUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AREN'T UNCLASSIFIED

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LIKELY TO IMPROVE EVEN IF SUCH AN ACCORD IS NEGOTIATED THIS YEAR.

5. IN CAPSULE FORM, THAT'S THE CONSENSUS OF WASHINGTON OFFICIALS WHO WATCH AND INTERPRET SOVIET MOVES. THE REASON FOR THEIR PESSIMISM: THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION REMAINS BEFUDDLED ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH MOSCOW. CAPITALIZING ON THIS CONFUSION, THE RUSSIANS ARE PRESSING TO

EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE.

6. "AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, IT WAS PRETTY CLEAR THAT THINGS WERE IN A DOWNWARD SPIRAL," A PENTAGON OFFICIAL SAYS. "THAT HAS NOT ONLY CONTINUED BUT ACCELERATED."

7. US OFFICIALS DON'T EXPECT MOSCOW TO PROVOKE MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS WITH THIS COUNTRY, BUT THEY DO SEE THE RUSSIANS PURSUING A STEADY CAMPAIGN TO EXTEND THEIR POWER AND TO TEST AMERICAN RESOLVE. WASHINGTON WORRIES THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY TRY TO MAKE TROUBLE IN THE MIDEAST, AN AREA OF VITAL US CONCERN, AND MAY VENTURE INTO RHODESIA TO BACK GUERRILLA FORCES TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT.

8. ALREADY SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN ETHIOPIA IS RAISING CONCERNS IN THIS COUNTRY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER CAN'T STAND UP TO THE RUSSIANS. IF THAT IMPRESSION PERSISTS, IT COULD IMPERIL SENATE RATIFICATION OF A NEW STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY (SALT II), PLACING FURTHER STRAINS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

9. CONTRASTING SOVIET DRIVE WITH AMERICAN DIFFIDENCE, UNCLASSIFIED

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ONE OF MR. CARTER'S CLOSEST FOREIGN-POLICY ADVISERS SAYS: "THEY WANT TO BE NO. 1: WE WANT TO BE COMFORTABLE."

10. IN THIS STRAINED ATMOSPHERE, SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE FLIES TO MOSCOW TOMORROW FOR TALKS WITH KREMLIN LEADERS TO TRY TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN ARMS-CONTROL TALKS. NO ONE EXPECTS MR. VANCE TO WRAP UP A TREATY WHILE HE IS THERE. BUT THE TWO SIDES MUST BEGIN TO NARROW THEIR REMAINING DIFFERENCES IF MR. CARTER IS TO MEET HIS GOAL OF CONCLUDING A NEW PACT BY THIS SUMMER.

11. BOTH MR. CARTER AND LEONID BREZHNEV, THE SOVIET LEADER, WANT A SALT TREATY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR INFLUENCE AT HOME AND ABROAD. AN AGREEMENT WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. BUT A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAYS A NEW TREATY "ISN'T GOING TO CREATE ANYTHING LIKE THE HIGH EXPECTATIONS WE HAD IN 1972; AT THAT TIME, SALT I BECAME THE SYMBOL OF AN ERA OF DETENTE, PROMISING INCREASED SUPERPOWER COOPERATION IN TRADE AND WORLD PEACE-KEEPING."

12. NOW "WE STAND AT THE EDGE OF A MORE ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RUSSIANS FOR A LONG PERIOD EVEN WITH A SALT AGREEMENT," SAYS A TOP ADMINISTRATION EXPERT ON THE SOVIET UNION.

13. THE FLOWER OF DETENTE NEVER BLOOMED. THE RUSSIANS DIDN'T GET U.S. TRADE CONCESSIONS THEY BADLY WANTED. THEY HAVE BEEN STUNG BY A SHARP LOSS OF INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND BY MR. CARTER'S HUMAN-RIGHTS STAND. AND THE SLOW PROGRESS TOWARD A NEW ARMS PACT FRUSTRATES THEM; WITHOUT A TREATY, MOSCOW FEARS, THE US WOULD EXPLOIT ITS TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY TO DEVELOP NEW AND BETTER WEAPONS.
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14. AMERICAN DISSATISFACTION CENTERS ON MOSCOW'S FAST MODERNIZATION OF ITS LONG-RANGE MISSILES UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF SALT I. MOSCOW'S ACTIVITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO AFRICA AND TO RADICAL ARAB STATES ALSO AROUSE DISCONTENT IN WASHINGTON.

15. BUT MR. VANCE WON'T STRESS SUCH TROUBLE-MAKING DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT. HE BELIEVES THAT A SALT AGREEMENT HAS MERIT ON ITS OWN AS A WAY TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THAT IT SHOULDN'T BE USED AS LEVERAGE TO CURB SOVIET MOVES IN OTHER AREAS. "THESE TALKS ARE GOING TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON SALT," A VANCE AIDE SAYS.

16. ONE REASON FOR THE FOCUS ON SALT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF ADVISERS--SECRETARY VANCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI--STRONGLY DISAGREE ON HOW TO RESOLVE OTHER DISPUTES WITH THE RUSSIANS. MR. VANCE FAVORS CALM DIPLOMACY, BUT MR. BRZEZINSKI ADVOCATES A TOUGH TIT-FOR-TAT APPROACH.

17. AND MR. CARTER APPEARS TO VACILLATE. A MONTH AGO THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED A SABER-RATTLING SPEECH, THREATENING TO MATCH THE RUSSIANS WEAPON FOR WEAPON. BUT TWO WEEKS LATER HE POSTPONED PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON BOMB AFTER A BIG SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THAT SOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR WEAPON.

18. "IT ALL ADDS UP TO CONFUSION," A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAYS. "THE RUSSIANS CAN'T DECIDE WHETHER WE ARE FRIENDLY, OR WEAK AND READY TO BE EXPLOITED. SO THEY'RE TESTING US." EVEN THE RUSSIANS
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SIANS COMPLAIN OF US VACILLATION. MR. BREZHNEV

"INDECISION" AND "INCONSISTENCY." AND A RECENT ARTICLE IN PRAVDA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER, ACCUSED THE US OF "HESITATION" AND "AMBIVALENCE" ON SALT.

19. ANALYSTS SEE SUCH STATEMENTS AS SOVIET POSTURING TO WIN SALT CONCESSIONS. BUT FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD BE POLITICALLY RISKY FOR MR. CARTER. IN FACT, UNLESS SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN AFRICA IMPROVES, ANY SALT TREATY MAY FACE FAILURE IN THE SENATE, WITH DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES FOR MR. CARTER'S LEADERSHIP AND FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

20. "I THINK SALT IS IN REAL TROUBLE," SAYS SEN. HENRY JACKSON, THE INFLUENTIAL WASHINGTON DEMOCRAT WHO INTENDS TO LEAD A FIGHT AGAINST SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY. HE SAYS THE PACT AS IT IS EMERGING GIVES TOO MANY ADVANTAGES TO THE RUSSIANS.

21. ADDS SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER HOWARD BAKER, "THERE'S A GROWING FEELING AMONG AMERICANS THAT WE'RE SLIPPING IN RELATION TO THE RUSSIANS." THAT SENSE RESULTS, HE SAYS, FROM PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA, TO KILL THE B-1 BOMBER AND TO POSTPONE PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON BOMB, ALL IN THE FACE OF A CONTINUING SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP.

22. THE GOP LEADER'S SUPPORT IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE THE STRONG BIPARTISAN BACKING NEEDED FOR SENATE RATIFICATION OF A SALT TREATY, AND RIGHT NOW THE TENNESSEAN SAYS HE CAN'T SUPPORT THE PACT. "DEBATE OVER THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES WILL LOOK LIKE A PICNIC COMPARED WITH THE SALT DEBATE," HE PREDICTS.

23. SOME WASHINGTON OFFICIALS FEAR THAT MR. CARTER
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MAY BE IGNORING THE MOOD IN CONGRESS AND IN THE COUNTRY. "VANCE OUGHT TO BE NEGOTIATING WITH JACKSON, NOT BREZHNEV," ONE ADVISER SAYS. AND SEN. JACKSON ASSERTS THAT "THE SO-CALLED PROFESSIONAL EXPERTS DOWNTOWN WILL MAKE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IF THEY THINK THE AMERICAN PUBLIC DOESN'T BELIEVE IN LINKAGE" BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

24. DEFENSE SECRETARY HAROLD BROWN CONCEDES THAT "TIMING, PUBLIC REACTION, CONGRESSIONAL REACTION--ALL OF WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO A SALT AGREEMENT--ARE INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY OTHER CONDITIONS." BUT HE

CONTENDS THAT "IF A SALT AGREEMENT IS IN OUR INTEREST, THEN WE SHOULD GO AHEAD AND CONSUMMATE IT" REGARDLESS OF OTHER SOVIET ACTIVITY.

25. MR. BROWN INSISTS THAT THE US IS MOVING TOWARD AN AGREEMENT THAT "PRESERVES OR IMPROVES OUR SECUR-

ITY" BY REQUIRING REDUCTIONS IN MOSCOW'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND SLOWING IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET FORCES. OFFICIALS SAY MR. CARTER WON'T SIGN A TREATY UNLESS IT PROVIDES CLEAR BENEFITS TO THE US AND THEY PREDICT SUCH A TREATY WILL WIN RATIFICATION NEXT YEAR AFTER A BITTER FIGHT.

26. US AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A NEW TREATY TO REPLACE THE SALT I PACT, WHICH EXPIRED LAST OCTOBER. BUT A HALF-DOZEN BIG ISSUES--INCLUDING HOW TO CONTROL THE SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBER--REMAIN UNSETTLED.

27. THE TREATY, RUNNING THROUGH OCTOBER 1985, WOULD UNCLASSIFIED

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INITIALLY RESTRICT EACH SIDE TO 2,400 STRATEGIC WEAPONS--INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUB-MARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND LONG-RANGE BOMBERS. DURING THE TERM OF THE TREATY, THIS TOTAL WOULD DROP TO BETWEEN 2,160 AND 2,250; THE EXACT NUMBER IS YET TO BE DETERMINED. OF THE TOTAL, 1,320 WOULD CARRY MULTIPLE WARHEADS. AND WITHIN THIS CATEGORY, THERE WOULD BE SEPARATE SUB-LIMITS--FOR EXAMPLE, 820 ICBM'S WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS.

28. THE EMERGING PACT ALSO INCLUDES A THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL DESIGNED TO SLOW THE MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. PROVISIONS INCLUDE A LIMIT ON FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW BALLISTIC MISSILES; A BAN ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBM-LAUNCHERS, INTENDED TO MAKE MISSILES LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK; AND A 1,560-MILE LIMIT ON THE RANGE OF AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. (THESE SMALL, PILOT-LESS JET PLANES, BEING DEVELOPED BY THE US CAN TRAVEL AS FAR AS 2,000 MILES.)

29. US OFFICIALS NOTE THAT THE TREATY WOULD REQUIRE MOSCOW TO SCRAP SEVERAL HUNDRED WEAPONS TO MEET THE NEW LIMIT. BUT OPPONENTS ARGUE THAT THE PACT WOULD ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO CONTINUE REPLACING ONE-WAR-HEAD MISSILES WITH ROCKETS CARRYING UP TO EIGHT HIGHLY ACCURATE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES; SUCH A MOVE WOULD MAKE

THEIR STRATEGIC STRIKING FORCE VASTLY MORE POWERFUL EVEN AS IT SHRINKS. IN ADDITION, THEY CHARGE THAT THE PROTOCOL RESTRAINTS WOULD HURT THE US MORE THAN THE SOVIET UNION.

30. SUPPORTERS INSIST THAT THE TREATY WOULDN'T PREVENT THE US FROM PROCEEDING WITH CURRENT WEAPONS-MODERNIZATION PLANS. THEY ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT FAILURE

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TO REACH AND RATIFY A TREATY WOULD INCREASE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY TENSION, COMPLICATE US ARMS PLANNING AND RAISE US DEFENSE COSTS BY ABOUT \$2 BILLION A YEAR.

31. BEYOND THAT, A TREATY WOULD OFFER A SMALL ELEMENT OF CERTAINTY IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS AT THE UNCERTAIN TIME OF A KREMLIN LEADERSHIP CHANGE. AT AGE 71 MR. BREZHNEV ISN'T EXPECTED TO HEAD THE RULING POLITBURO MUCH LONGER. US ANALYSTS DON'T KNOW WHO WILL SUCCEED HIM OR HOW A SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHUFFLE WOULD AFFECT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

32. "ARMS CONTROL CAN'T BY ITSELF GUARANTEE STABILITY IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP," SECRETARY VANCE ACKNOWLEDGES. BUT HE SAYS IT CAN HELP AT A TIME WHEN "WE CONTINUE TO COMPETE BECAUSE IN MANY AREAS WE HAVE DIFFERENT INTERESTS AND VALUES."

33. IF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION UNANIMOUSLY FAVORS ARMS CONTROL, IT IS BADLY DIVIDED ON HOW TO MEET SOVIET COMPETITION ELSEWHERE--A DIVISION THAT DOESN'T HELP THE MOSCOW-WASHINGTON RELATIONSHIP.

34. TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN AFRICA, SOME ADVISERS ARGUE THAT THE US SHOULD INCREASE ECONOMIC AID TO CHINA AND EVEN CONSIDER ARMING THE COMMUNIST GIANT SO FEARED BY MOSCOW. OR, SOME OFFICIALS SAY, IF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PEACE EFFORTS IN RHODESIA FAIL AND THE RUSSIANS VENTURE IN TO BACK GUERRILLA FORCES, PERHAPS THE US SHOULD SUPPLY ARMS TO THE GOVERNMENT; THE GUERRILLAS ARE SEEKING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH NOW INCLUDES MODERATE BLACKS. OTHER POLICY MAKERS CONTENT THAT SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNCLASSIFIED

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IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS POST-VIETNAM ERA.

35. CONCEIVABLY, MOSCOW MIGHT RESTRAIN ITS ACTIONS TO WIN MORE US TRADE AND CREDIT. BUT CONGRESS IS UNLIKELY TO GRANT SUCH ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS IN THE CURRENT CLIMATE. ACKNOWLEDGING THE ADMINISTRATION'S INABILITY

SO FAR TO COME UP WITH A PACKAGE OF INCENTIVES AND PENALTIES FOR THE RUSSIANS, A TOP WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL SAYS, " IF WE COULD TURN THE CORNER IN OUR RELATIONS, WE WOULDN'T RULE OUT NEW PROPOSALS IN THE ECONOMIC AREA." BUT CONGRESS MIGHT STILL BALK.

36. THE OUTLOOK CAN'T BE ENTIRELY GLOOMY AS LONG AS SOVIET AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS KEEP TALKING. AND BESIDES DICKERING ON STRATEGIC-ARMS CONTROL, THE TWO NATIONS HAVE AGREED TO START DISCUSSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT BANNING ATTACKS AGAINST SPACE SATELLITES. US-SOVIET TALKS ON CURBING SALES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, CONTROLLING NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND LIMITING TROOPS IN EUROPE ARE CONTINUING.

37. BUT IT DOESN'T COST MOSCOW ANYTHING, JUST TO TALK, AND TALK DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN COOPERATION. "WE'RE ESSENTIALLY ADVERSARIES," ONE US OFFICIAL SAYS. "I SEE THE COMPETITION AS VERY SHARP AND CONTINUING FOR A LONG TIME." CHRISTOPHER

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